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Historical and Philosophical Stances




1 On 28 July 1985, well into his retirement, Max Fisch – student of Roman law, translator of
the  Italian  rhetorician,  Giambattista  Vico,  and  scholar  of  the  American  philosopher,
Charles Sanders Peirce – was asked whether he thought Vico had been right about some
things and wrong about others. Fisch’s response was hesitant. “There’s something a bit
personal about this,” he confessed, “and I am having a little difficulty detaching myself
from what led me to Vico and trying to think in entirely impersonal terms about Vico.”1
What Fisch meant was that, for him, there was no clear or easily narratable distinction
between the work that he did to make Vico available to an Anglophone public and the
way  in  which,  in  the  1930s,  he  had  encountered  this  eighteenth-century  Neapolitan
thinker as someone who (in effect) had said to him “every piece of serious scholarly work
that you have done to this point is wrong.” Fisch had defended a dissertation in 1930 on
the influence of Stoicism on Roman law, and he had come across Vico while conducting
research he hoped would lead to the publication of the dissertation as a book. Thus, Fisch
encountered Vico as a fellow scholar and not as a historical artefact. Far from being a
moment of merely biographical significance, I think that Fisch’s hesitant response to this
question – posed by Fisch’s former student, Don Roberts – is in fact a sign of something
unavoidable, perilous, and absolutely essential about intellectual historical inquiry. Fisch
was both philosopher and historian. His life’s work is, I submit, a study in the ways in
which – for some purposes – one cannot be the one without also being the other.
2 The question of whether intellectual historians, these hybrid creatures working in the
interstice  between  the  disciplines  of  philosophy  and  history,  may  legitimately  be
interested in asserting in their own voices the assertions they find in the historical record
is one that has been posed in a number of forms – and answered in a variety of ways. To a
degree, Fisch was conscious of this. Indeed, when Roberts continued his interview with
Fisch in October of 1985 by asking about Fisch’s 1961 paper on “The History of Philosophy
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Delusion,” Fisch responded immediately by saying that one might think his paper had
been superseded by a book bearing the title, Philosophy in History, published the previous
year, edited by Richard Rorty, Jerry Schneewind, and “an Englishman” (Quentin Skinner).
2 In their introduction, the editors had argued that some via media ought to be found
between  those  historians  of  philosophy  who  thought  intellectual  historians  were
grubbing  antiquarians  and  those  intellectual  historians  who  regarded  historians  of
philosophy as nothing more than partisans of some presently ascendant philosophical
school.3
3 Yet the Rorty et al. volume itself embodied a tension on whether intellectual historians
might take up – as their own – questions that motivated thinkers in the histories they
were writing. On the one hand, Quentin Skinner accepted that it was difficult to write the
intellectual history of something one regarded as nonsense (religion was his example),
but he also argued that, because there were no “perennial problems” in the history of
thought,  much  of  a  historian’s  work  would  consist  of  attempts  to  situate  texts  in
argumentative contexts in order to highlight the difference between conventional and
non-conventional answers to questions that were not the historian’s questions.4 A line of
inquiry went back from the Rorty et al. volume to what has become one of the most cited
essays in the history of intellectual history (namely, the 1969 piece on “Meaning and
Understanding in the History of Ideas”), and that essay was itself a continuation of an
earlier initiative articulated by R. G. Collingwood following his translation of Benedetto
Croce’s La Filosofia di Giambattista Vico.5 On the other hand, the Rorty et al. volume was also
a pivotal text in the development of a pragmatist line of interpretation taken up by Rorty
in his own contribution to that volume – namely, “The Historiography of Philosophy:
Four Genres.” Rorty certainly permitted historians to be intellectually fired up by the
questions posed by the historical figures they studied, and we should note that aspects of
Rorty’s  thinking  are  still  presently  evolving  in  the  work  of  Robert  Brandom,  whose
distinctions  in  Tales  of  the  Mighty  Dead between  de  re,  de  dicto,  and  de  traditione
historiographies are intimately connected with the issues under discussion here.6
4 Now, to my knowledge, Fisch did not follow up on his allusion to Philosophy in History
(although after the exchange with Roberts, Fisch seems to have headed off to find the
volume – “I’ll see if I have the book here”).7 Nevertheless, the remarks we do possess link
Fisch to broader debates about the relationship between history and philosophy, and we
do see comparable tensions in Fisch’s own articulation of that relationship. On the one
hand,  in his  “History of  Philosophy Delusion,” Fisch had denied that there were any
“eternal problems” in philosophy and had argued that, therefore, one should not ask
whether one was persuaded or unpersuaded by, for example, Descartes’s argument for
the existence of God. Instead, Fisch had claimed, one should inquire into the relationship
between the method articulated in the Discours and the method utilized in the Dioptrique.
Was  Descartes  right?  Wrong  question.  How  should  we  speak  of  these  theories  and
practices as moments in a sequence of inquiry? That was the issue.8 On the other hand, in
1985, Fisch wanted to clarify that such assertions did not mean that one could not agree
with Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner that history and philosophy might be deeply
imbricated. It was as if the history of thought might suggest problems and solutions, even
as one ought not to place oneself in judgment over it.
5 Here is my claim: Fisch may not have pursued the questions raised by Philosophy in History
about the tension between historical and philosophical pursuits, but intellectually he led
a vivid life at the intersection of these two commitments, and so, for anyone interested in
Historical and Philosophical Stances
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-2 | 2016
2
this tension, his life takes on the quality of exemplarity. Born in 1900, Fisch graduated
first from James Russell Lowell High School in San Francisco, then from Butler University
in Indianapolis with a degree in philosophy (where he studied with Elijah Jordan), and
finally from Cornell University with a doctorate focused on the history of philosophy in
the ancient world. He worked in departments of philosophy at Case Western Reserve
University,  the  University  of  Illinois  at  Urbana-Champaign,  and  Indiana  University–
Purdue University Indianapolis. His core intellectual achievements were two: translating
(with Thomas Goddard Bergin) Vico’s 1744 Scienza nuova and founding the chronological
edition of the works of Peirce (a project that is ongoing). These bare, even unimpressive,
facts do little to convey the significance of the life of this mind. In fact, the claim I want to
make about this life is quite ambitious: the case of Max Fisch articulates one of the most
basic tensions experienced by intellectual historians.9
6 The procedure here is broadly chronological. Fisch’s experience of the distance between
history and philosophy can be explored under five headings: law, translation, institution,
style, and semiosis. These headings are not, strictly speaking, phases that follow one upon
another in a discrete fashion, but they do identify preoccupations that are most intense
in, respectively, each of the five decades between 1930 and 1980. In what follows, this
“distance” between history and philosophy will appear alternatively as an irreconcilable
tension, a fertile ambiguity, and a problematic gap. My purpose is neither to praise nor to
blame Fisch per se but  rather to take him as an extremely instructive example of  a
difficulty that intellectual historians must learn how to face. Readers of fiction practice a
“suspension of  disbelief,”  and one of  the core questions for  intellectual  historians is
whether  they  must  practice  an  analogous  “suspension  of  belief.”  In  the  process  of
showing  how  Fisch  responded  to  this  challenge,  I  hope  to  make  manifest  and
communicable what was really distinctive about his work – to give some value to the as
yet  unused and undetermined adjective  “Fischian.”  The  aim is  to  explore  these  five
headings in such a way that each provides a distinctive vocabulary for expressing the
difficulty.  Fisch did not “solve” the writing of intellectual history, nor did he resolve
history  and  philosophy  into  each  other.  What  he can  do  is  show  us  what  writing
intellectual history is like and reveal its contours under a variety of configurations.10
 
2. Law
7 We do not have many sources attesting to the origins of Fisch’s experience of the distance
between philosophy and history in the field of law. To be sure, we have the typescript of
Fisch’s  1930 dissertation on “The Influence of  Stoicism on Roman Law” (kept  in the
special collections of Cornell University Library) as well as the heavily annotated personal
copy that Fisch revised in the course of the 1930s (now held by the Peirce Edition Project
at IUPUI). But it is necessary to turn to later sources in order to understand why Fisch
decided to proceed with research on this topic when he arrived at Cornell in 1924 and
found his prospective doctoral advisor (James Edwin Creighton) already on his deathbed.
Particularly  revealing  is  a  manuscript  dated  16  February  1940  in  which  Fisch  was
preparing himself for a piece on the “Social Ideals of American Jurists.” In a spirit of self-
criticism that may have been modeled to him by the Vita di Giambattista Vico scritta da se
medesimo (with which he was already familiar and that he would publish in an English
translation four years later), Fisch sketched out some “Biographical Data with a Possible
Bearing on the Choice of Subject.” He presented montage: school-boy obsession with the
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Gregg  shorthand  used  by  court  reporters,  a  seventeen-year-old  self  orating  at  the
unveiling of General Frederick Funston’s statue at City Hall in San Francisco being told
that he had the makings of a lawyer (and later realizing the remark may not have been a
compliment), an undergraduate at Butler University “captured for philosophy” by Elijah
Jordan, whose Forms of Individuality and Theory of Legislation he declared the “toughest,
most original and most important work by an American on the philosophy of law,” and
marriage into a family of lawyers when he wed Ruth Bales in 1927.11
8 Hindsight, however, is never quite to be trusted. In that same manuscript, at a distance of
only  ten years,  Fisch miscited the  title  of  his  Cornell  dissertation,  referring to  it  as
“Stoicism and Roman Law,” thereby eliding a crucial term in the original title, which had
been “The Influence of Stoicism on Roman Law.” 12 The slip or revision may have been
significant. The chief argument of Fisch’s dissertation had been that Stoic philosophy was
such a dominant cultural milieu in imperial Rome that the legal system, Rome’s chief
intellectual  achievement,  was  shot  through  with  indirectly  received  and  often
unconscious  Stoicism.13 “Influence”  was  a  category  that  Fisch  employed  as  a  kind  a
tactical  retrenchment against the notions of  cause that he was resisting,  particularly
those predicated on an economic determinism that allowed no independent role for ideas
in the promulgation of a legal culture.14 Remarkably, even as this was the central concept
in the work, Fisch noted within the dissertation itself that “the commonsense and quasi-
scientific category of ‘influence,’ with which we have been working throughout, breaks
down  in  proportion  as  our  canvas  becomes  crowded  with  detail  and  approaches
lifelikeness.”15 Fisch  may  at  first  have  meant  this  as  an  assertion  of  his  historical
ambition. He thought that the indirectness of influence was precisely one of its conceptual
advantages  over  the  Newton’s  cradle  or  base/superstructure  imaginary  of  historians
searching for causes and effects.
9 I conjecture that the conception of “influence” was the core weakness of the dissertation
and that Fisch never published it because with increasing acuity he saw the impracticality
of the concept. Even as he was annotating the finished dissertation in the years after
1930, Fisch – nailing his colors to the mast – claimed that “the Stoicism of those who
professed it is less significant for our purpose than that of those who did not.”16 In this
way, the desire to prove that Stoicism had achieved its effect more by cultural saturation
and  conceptual  osmosis  than  by,  for  instance,  quotation  functioned  as  a  constant
frustration  because,  necessarily,  no  direct  evidence  could  be  presented  for  the
indirectness  of  the  influence.  For  our  current  purposes,  the  key  point  is  this:  Fisch
designed his dissertation in such a way that philosophy could have no direct philological
antistrophe. That is, Fisch committed himself to the pursuit of ideas that were minimally
manifest in particular places and times.
10 Precisely when Fisch encountered Vico for the first time is unclear. Later, he would relay
that he could not recall Jordan, his undergraduate mentor, ever referring to Vico.17 Glenn
R. Morrow, a fellow graduate student from Cornell, who had been slightly ahead of Fisch
and had studied with Creighton, wrote to Fisch upon the publication of the Autobiography
translation in 1944 to say that he was taken back to the days in Ithaca when Creighton
had him reading “Flint, and Hume, and Voltaire, and Montesquieu, and Croce’s Vico” in
preparation for a volume on historical method in philosophy. But Fisch had not studied
with Creighton, and it is not clear that Morrow and Fisch discussed Vico when they were
graduate students.18 Vico may have come up when Fisch and a number of other professors
at Western Reserve University in Cleveland gathered with Thomas Goddard Bergin (who
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would become Fisch’s collaborator on the Vico translations) to read Dante in the 1930s.19
What we do know is that, as Fisch would come to recount the story on several occasions
after the fact,  Vico was encountered as the living force of a scholar who said,  “Your
dissertation is fundamentally misconceived and beyond repair.”20 Where Fisch had said
that Greece influenced Rome, Vico responded that theories of cultural diffusion were
superficial and that the real historical task was to account for origins as autochthonous.
Where Fisch had said that philosophy informed law, Vico responded that philosophy was
itself an outgrowth of political discord that registered itself in the law first. And where
Fisch  had  said  that  influence  lost  its  conceptual  integrity  the  closer  it  got  to  the
specificity of the actual, Vico responded that the law could only be understood as a kind
of tension between the extreme particularity of cases and the philosophic universality of
principle.
11 Fisch himself registered the first two of these Vichian responses more clearly than the
third, but I would argue that it is in fact the third that is the most crucial here.21 Vico’s
sense of the tension between (and potential cooperation of) philology and philosophy
would become an increasingly important point of reference for Fisch in the 1940s. In the
context of law, Vico’s key terms of art were certum (the particular, the determinate, the
certain) and verum (the true, the intelligible, the principled). What Vico sought to identify
here was the way in which law as an institution was compelled to take seriously two
essentially different and perhaps ultimately irreconcilable modes of being. The historicity
of Roman law, as Vico put it,  derived from the way in which the utter specificity of
judgments  in  particular  cases  –  instances  of  what  one  might  term pure  and violent
exception  –  came in  time  to  be  interrogated  for  their  value  as  precedents.  As  Vico
conceived it in his Diritto universale (1720-22), the first “sentence” of the law had in fact
been a public execution, and, in effect, he explained that the “life” of the law was an
ongoing articulation of what precisely the crime was that warranted this punishment.
That is,  the principle of verum had to play catch-up with the fait-accompli of certum.
Precedent, in turn, raised issues of equity and a kind of principle that might even be
expressed abstractly as a rule that could be applied to cases but that was not itself a case.
In this way, Fisch learned from Vico that the history of concepts could be narrated as a
series of increments in which parties discovered the meaning of the letter of the law by
construing its particular verdicts as nascent principles.
12 In truth, analogues of this tension – or dialectic – between certum and verum had been
present, but subordinate, in the dissertation of 1930. In particular, Fisch’s attention to the
role of the praetor in the development of Roman law allowed him to focus on tensions
between the  ius  civile of  the  Twelve  Tables  and the  ius  honorarium that  grew out  of
Praetorian judgments regarding aliens, which mirrored – in his mind – the tensions of
which Stoicism was extremely mindful between the laws of particular places, whether
customary or positive, and the ius gentium that reached out beyond the bounds of Roman
citizenship to propose a simulacrum of universal law.22 Likewise,  Fisch was struck by
Selden’s  early  modern  English  notion  that  “equity  is  a  roguish  thing”  and  could,
effectively, function as a form of prerogative, because the sovereigns would make rules
out of their whim in granting it.23 Similarly, he thought his account of Greek influence at
Rome  could  be  furthered  by  tracing  conceptions  of  ἐπιείκεια,  “reasonableness”
(developed  by  Aristotle  in  his  Rhetoric).24 Moreover,  according  to  Fisch,  Stoicism
distinguished itself – particularly from Platonic and Aristotelian accounts of form – by
developing a rich theory of individuation (which, he contended, had legal implications).25
Historical and Philosophical Stances
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-2 | 2016
5
And  he  was  very  interested  in  the Stoic  conception  of  καθήκων  (meeting,  meeting
halfway, being appropriate) together with the kind of casuistry that it sponsored. As Fisch
pointed out, “there is nothing more characteristic of Stoicism than its preoccupation with
the definition of  [καθήκων]  and its  casuistic  application to the most  varied concrete
situations.”26 The principle of acting in a way that was appropriate to the situation had
infinite variations.
13 As Fisch’s interest in law was beginning to inform his subsequent intellectual initiatives
in  the  fields  of  Vico  studies  and  the  history  of  pragmatism  in  the  1940s,  we  see
developments in his sense of the ways in which case-based casuistic systems such as the
law might have to accept that the meanings of decisions would only become visible over
time. Vico was there in the footnotes to Fisch’s seminal essay on “Justice Holmes, the
Prediction Theory of Law, and Pragmatism” of 1942, telling the author, “First popular
government;  then  law;  then  philosophy,”  thereby  licensing  the  hypothesis  that
pragmatism grew out of the prediction theory of law and not vice versa – case to rule not
rule to case.27 And Vico’s contribution to legal studies was then addressed directly in
“Vico on Roman Law” of 1948.28 But what was really crucial in the “Prediction Theory of
Law” essay was Fisch’s understanding of the significance of Holmes’s notion that the true
– and only – criterion for evaluating lawyers was their ability to predict what judges
would decide in particular cases. What was crucial was the lawyer’s ability to predict what
a judge would take a particular statute or precedent to mean in the circumstances of a
case.29 What this implied was that the meaning of any legal utterance was to be evaluated
in terms of the future decisions that might be said to follow from it.
14 What Vico had understood as a historical category, Holmes transposed into the future,
but the effect was essentially the same for someone like Fisch who was learning to ask
how  the  particularities  of  the  historical  record  might  be  said  to  interact  with  the
philosophical abstractions of principle. This was the effect: meaning was virtual, in the
sense that the implications of the letter of the law could only be understood in terms of
proclivities to act in the future. Those actions might be predicted or narrated historically;
the difference seemed negligible – at least until 1969, as we shall see. For Fisch, the law
was such a decisive institution (not simply socially or politically but for the process of
thinking as such), because it forced individuals and communities to confront very basic
issues concerning the relationship between time and idea. Try as they might sometimes,
legal institutions were often very bad at forgetting themselves. A multiplicity of answers
would accrue to a problem that could not be ignored (because the institution was charged
with providing very practical remedies), and in order to deal with that multiplicity a host
of distinctions and specifications to rules needed to be elucidated. The history of law was
thus a model for the history of concepts: acts became examples becoming rules producing
exceptions brokering thereby the piecemeal removal of ceteris paribus riders. In this way,
the institution of the law provided Fisch with a basic template for understanding how the
historian of thought and the thinker might be the same person.
 
3. Translation
15 Having encountered Vico as the destroyer of his dissertation in the 1930s, Fisch travelled
to Naples in 1939 in order to explore the possibility of translating his masterwork, the
Scienza nuova, into English. Benedetto Croce and Fausto Nicolini told him they knew of no
one who was attempting such a translation, and so Fisch invited Bergin to join him in
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Naples  to  make an exploratory start  on the work.  Around this  time,  it  seems,  Fisch
composed a list of questions for Croce and Nicolini, the second of which went as follows:
“utmost  possible  literalness,  or  such  a  degree  of  paraphrase  as  would  make  the
translation really a commentary on the text, or something in between?” The answer next
to “utmost possible literalness,” written in pencil,  was “yes.”30 This was a significant
decision, with implications for the reception of Vico in the Anglophone world. The effect
was  to  repeatedly  force  the  translators  back  to  the  Italian  original  to  find  ways  of
replicating  its  particularities  as  much  as  possible  without  producing  a  kind  of
stenography that would be unintelligible to the Anglophone reader.
16 The tension between the love of words that is philology and the love of wisdom that is
philosophy is perhaps nowhere quite so minutely palpable as in the work of translation.
Certainly, Fisch and Bergin narrated their collaboration as a kind of dialectic between
philology and philosophy. In their representations of the process, Bergin – an Italianist –
would generate a very literal translation that Fisch would remold into a smoother and
more  conceptually  structured  form.  They  would  continue  to  exchange  the  draft
translation – by letter after an initial week or two together on Capri in 1939 – until, as
they put it, neither of them could see a way of going any further.31 This was the method
they used both for the translation of Vico’s autobiography (which they published first, in
1944,  having  learned  later  in  1939  that Elio  Gianturco  was  working  on  an  English
translation of the Scienza nuova) and for the translation of the magnum opus, which they
eventually published in 1948 (reasoning that Gianturco had had nine years to finish his
translation and had therefore lost his right of first attempt).32
17 The effort was heroic. Even Italians speak of a need to get fit while preparing to read the
Scienza nuova. And the method employed was successful. The anti-Fascist politician and
historian, Gaetano Salvemini, confessed that he preferred Bergin and Fisch’s English to
Vico’s Italian.33 But it is not clear that Bergin and Fisch’s tidy representation of their
collaboration was always accurate. The manuscript sources attesting to the translation
process are fragmentary and incomplete, but they cast a different light on the division of
labor between Bergin and Fisch. At times, in his letters to Fisch, Bergin would simply
throw up his hands ostentatiously and confess that he has no idea what Vico was on
about.  Thus,  “literalness”  may sometimes have been evidence of  incomprehension,  a
sticking to the letter because the spirit could not be divined. Once, an exasperated Bergin
– described lovingly by Fisch as the “poet and humorist of my life” after his death in 1987
– declared that Vichian prose gave “every indication of having been written in a nursing
home or while undergoing the Neapolitan equivalent of the Keeley Cure.”34 On another
occasion,  Fisch  called  attention  to  the  silent  omission  of  several  pages  in  Bergin’s
“transliteration” of the autobiography, asking politely but firmly, “Could you have been
following Michelet [who had produced an abbreviated paraphrase in French] a bit too
closely?” Thus, although Fisch would later describe himself as philosopher to Bergin’s
philologist, we should not conclude that verbal scrupulosity was not one of his concerns
or one of his talents. Indeed, whatever the division of labor between the translators, we
must say that Fisch was both philosopher and philologist.
18 Recall that Vico himself cast the Scienza nuova as an attempt to synthesize philosophical
and philological modes of inquiry. He defined filosofia as that which contempla la ragione,
onde viene la scienza del vero (that which “contemplates reason, whence comes knowledge
of the true”). And he defined filologia as an observing of l’autorità dell’umano arbitrio, onde
viene  la  coscienza  del  certo (“the  authority  of  human  choice  [that  is,  human  choice
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considered in terms of what it authors], whence comes consciousness of the certain.”35
Manifestly, therefore, these disciplines were modifications of the tension between verum 
and certum that Vico had thought central to the historicity of Roman law. The implication
was that there could be no possibility of separating the content of the Scienza nuova from
the form of its expression. Every translator of the work has labored in the shadow of this
intimidating proposition. In general, the vast majority of readers have marveled at the
ingenuity of the Bergin and Fisch translation. Erich Auerbach, who had himself published
a German translation of  the Scienza nuova in 1924,  judged it  “the most complete and
accurate” translation in any language.36 Perceptively, Auerbach thought the translation
“very conservative” in matters of terminology, less so with regard to syntax. Bergin and
Fisch had indeed made the conscious choice to break up many of Vico’s sentences, but
(although Auerbach would perhaps have disagreed) I would argue that forcing readers to
grapple with the strangeness and simultaneously poetic and technical quality of Vico’s
vocabulary – witness autorità above – enables those readers to work at reenacting the
overall vision that the Neapolitan thought so distinguished his work and that he had
worked to convey by means of  an extremely intricate or “networked” syntax.37 Vico
spoke explicitly about the pleasure readers were to experience in reproducing the science
in  their  own  minds.38 The  Bergin  and  Fisch  translation  permits  that.  Miraculously
compact and austere, it rewards close attention.39
19 Fisch’s  terminological  punctiliousness  in  matters  of  translation  was  perhaps  most
expansively attested to in a later essay, published in 1974, called “The Poliscraft.”40 Staged
as a dialogue between a political scientist, a philosopher, and a classicist (who teach the
history of political thought from Plato to Rousseau, ethics from Aristotle to Mill,  and
ancient history, respectively), the piece argued that modern disciplinarity has divided
what was united in Aristotelian inquiry. In the Greek originals, Fisch contended, there
were no clearly  distinct  terms for  what  moderns  refer  to  as  “politics”  and “ethics”:
ή πολιτική ought to be defamiliarized as “poliscraft” (the capacity to, and knowledge of
how to, act in the polis), and one should not speak of Aristotelian “ethics” at all. Aristotle
never used the term, ή ἠθική. Philologically, what Aristotle had done, Fisch pointed out,
was coin the adjective ἠθικός from the nouns ἔθος (“a custom or habit”) and ἦθος (“a
total character composed of such customs or habits”), such that he could speak of ἀρεταί
ἠθικαί  –  excellences  in  habitual  character.41 Decisions  in  translation  here  had
implications  for  whether  a  reader  might  suppose  that  Aristotle  was  proposing  a
universally applicable science of morals or was observing excellences in the Greek polis,
and Fisch concluded that there was ultimately no alternative to facing-page translations
in which the tensions  between source and target  language could be made publically
manifest.42
20 Martha Nussbaum, then a graduate student working on her critical edition of Aristotle’s
De motu animalium,  agreed with Fisch about facing-page translations in a letter dated
10 July 1975, but she was pessimistic about the future of editions like the Loebs that Fisch
was recommending. (Given the recent extension of the Loeb principle into the I Tatti
Renaissance Library,  perhaps she was too pessimistic.)  After reading “The Poliscraft,”
though,  she referred Fisch to an essay on “The Penguinification of  Plato” by Trevor
J. Saunders, which she thought might well be relevant.43 In Fisch’s annotated copy of that
piece, the following assertion is underlined: “a translation should not lift the reader out
of the ancient world, but immerse him in it; and the reader must be prepared to think
himself imaginatively into that world.”44 Fisch, it would seem, believed that reading the
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New Science should be an exercise in controlled alienation,  even as Vico could be an
author who spoke in the manner of a living interlocutor. In his negative review of David
Marsh’s  1999 Penguin translation of  the 1744 Scienza nuova,  Donald Phillip Verene,  a
leader in Anglophone Vico studies,  agreed.  Marsh had done too much,  he argued,  to
render Vico contemporary.45 And the success of that edition (which, it seems, continues
to outsell the Bergin and Fisch version) may well be a failure.
21 The most brilliant example of Fisch’s extreme acuity in sensing nuances at the border
between  syntax  and  semantics  came  slightly  earlier  in  the  1969  essay,  “Vico  and
Pragmatism.” There,  Fisch established connections between Vico and the other great
preoccupation of his mature intellectual life, Charles S. Peirce. At the very end of an essay
replete with provocative perceptions, Fisch added a “last suggestion.” Engaging in a form
of conjectural history, he asked himself what Peirce would have said about Vico’s famous
verum-factum principle if he had encountered it, late in life. After all, Vico’s notion that
the true or the intelligible (verum) was synonymous with the made or the done (factum)
might well seem to be a crucial anticipation of pragmatism. Exercising at this moment an
almost  peerless  capacity  to  think by  means  of  the  categories  brought  into  being  by
grammar, Fisch proposed that Peirce would have said that if Vico had thought in Greek
instead of in Latin, he might well have arrived at pragmatism, because, whereas the Latin
term factum was a past participle doing duty as an adjectival noun, the Greek term τὸ
πρᾶγμα  privileged no temporal  span,  neither past  nor future –  and,  indeed,  it  could
countenance the most abstract hypotheticals too. A synonymy between the intelligible
and that which might be done would have gotten Vico to pragmatism, Fisch thought
(impersonating Peirce).  There are no words for the exquisiteness of this observation.
Even if, at some point, we were to discover that it had been wrong (after, say, finding
some manuscript in which Peirce relayed his reaction to Vico’s principle), the suggestion
is  justified because its  sheer  acuity brings into being so many other possibilities  for
thought.46
22 A translation is an interpretation. Many would accept that. What Fisch wanted to achieve,
I believe, was a kind of doubleness in the translated text that would attest to the fact that
it was, indeed, just such an interpretation. In the case of facing-page translations, such
doubling may be indicated very literally. In the case of single-language translations like
the Autobiography and the New Science, however, this doubling had to be achieved by other
means. It is my contention that the conservativeness of the Bergin and Fisch translation,
especially in matters of terminology, is a means to this end. The linguistic alterity of the
text,  which does not leave its target language unchanged (just as the original Scienza
nuova did  not  leave  Italian  unchanged),  requires  Anglophone  readers  to  work  at
reconstructing the text’s meaning. Because of the skill and precision of the translation,
however, this work is rewarded. The reader gains a capacity to generate Vichian thought
processes because the basic structure of the original – its conceptual grammar, one might
say – is left intact. What this means is that the New Science makes it possible for future




23 In 1961, Bergin and Fisch issued a revised and abridged edition of their translation of the
Scienza nuova. Fisch wrote a new and more substantial introduction to replace the short
Historical and Philosophical Stances
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-2 | 2016
9
preface that had accompanied the 1948 version. True to his sense of the inventive power
of philological scruple, Fisch organized this introduction as a primer on the key Vichian
terms that appeared in the titles of the various editions of the Scienza nuova. In particular,
Fisch drew the reader’s attention to the ways in which Latin etymologies of Italian words
lurked behind Vico’s usages and modulated them in subtle and crucial ways. Occasionally,
Vico himself would point this out. More often, the usage was tacit.47 Fisch closed the
introduction by offering remarks on a number of other key terms, one of which was cosa.
In the original translation of 1948, Bergin and Fisch had rendered the term as “thing”
(the most obvious and uncontroversial option), but in the 1961 revision they chose the
more technical “institution” instead. Thus, instead of “The Recurrence of Human Things,”
Del ricorso delle cose umane (the title of Book V) was rendered as “The Recourse of Human
Institutions.”  Some  readers  have  been  critical  of  the  substitution;  others  have  been
puzzled.48 In fact, Fisch’s insertion of “institution” was the product of almost a decade’s
worth of thinking about that term and its significance both for philosophers and for
historians.
24 Five  years  earlier,  Fisch  had  addressed  the  Western  Division  of  the  American
Philosophical Association as its president and had posed this question: “we who sit here
tonight as members of a philosophical association – what have we in common besides the
association?”49 By way of answer, Fisch rejected the definition of the philosopher as a
critic of abstractions, as proffered by Alfred North Whitehead, and argued for a variant:
“the critic of institutions.”50 Fisch thought that Whitehead’s account focused the role of
philosophy too narrowly on the concept use of scientists. Fisch preferred “institutions” to
“abstractions” because it allowed one to focus on a much wider array of phenomena,
which he described simply as the class of things that had been brought into being by
action, that persisted (insofar as they persisted) in the manner of habitual action, but that
could  be  otherwise.51 In  a  move  that  surely  derived  in  part  from  his  philosophical
inheritance from Elijah Jordan and that  was continued (although rather unhappily,  I
would argue) in Lawrence Haworth’s The Good City,  Fisch emphasized that institutions
were to be understood in terms of practices, practices most particularly that participated
in the constitution of communities.52
25 In fact, there were multiple ways in which Fisch had been practically and theoretically
focused on the role played by institutions in creating community in the course of the
1950s.  Beginning  now  to  work  more  intensively  on  the  history  of  pragmatism,  Fisch
emphasized Peirce’s insistence that a university was not “an institution for instruction”
but rather “an institution for study” – a term that for both of them connoted not simply
research but inquiry as such.53 A year after that, Fisch published the results of his 1950-51
Fulbright year in Naples where he had worked on the seventeenth-century Neapolitan
Accademia degli  Investiganti,  which,  he thought,  had influenced Vico’s  sense of what a
science might be and what a community of inquiry might look like.54 Between 1950 and
1955, Fisch had served on the board of the newly inaugurated International Association of
Universities,  arguing  for  the  importance  of  a  scientific internationalism  that  was
genuinely  opposed  to  the  increasing  subordination  of  research  to  the  nationalist
requirements of what Eisenhower would soon dub “the military-industrial complex.”55
Having been a Fulbright Professor at Keio University in Japan during 1958-9, Fisch noted
that Japanese had no terms to differentiate a college from a university, and he proceeded
to set out a vision of what “the university ideal” implied for the practice of research.56
Fisch’s earlier work at the Army Medical Library in Cleveland during World War II and his
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subsequent  dedication  to  the  production  of  bibliographies  and  research  aids,  not  to
mention, obviously, the bringing into being of conditions of possibility for scholarship by
translating Vico into English and establishing a chronological edition of the writings of
Peirce, or even his ceaseless provision of questions, hypotheses, and points of departure
for  students  and other  scholars  –  all  of  this  is  to be understood in terms of  Fisch’s
theoretical  investment  in  the  concept  of  institution  and  in  terms  of  his  practical
commitment to the particular kind of institution that is a research community.
26 While in Japan, Fisch had attended the IXth International Congress for the History of
Religions held in Tokyo and Kyoto. He had delivered two papers – one on “The Creation of
Universal Institutions” and another on “The Idea of Institution in the Major Religions.” In
the first of these, Fisch announced that “the problem of our time is the creation of a
world community,” which he deemed physically possible and spiritually dubious. Such a
community,  were  it  constituted  at  a  governmental  level  and  were  it  to  become
totalitarian in nature, might prove less tolerable even than its alternative – which Fisch
identified as nuclear warfare and the renewed “barbarism of irradiation” that it would
bring.57 Fisch’s  preference was  for a  proliferation of  transnational  non-governmental
organizations,  and the question that he posed to his audience was what role religion
might play in such a proliferation,  “to what extent the major religions of  the world
conduce to, or merely tolerate, or aggressively oppose, such an experimental attitude
toward institutions of all kinds.”58
27 In his second paper, Fisch made the connection to Vico, who, after all, had argued that
religion – alongside marriage and burial – was one of the three most basic and most
universal  human  institutions.  Fisch  contrasted  two  accounts  of  institutions,  one
rationalistic (in which institutions were brought about by design), the other naturalistic
(where unconscious habits over time coalesced into accepted ways of doing things). He
noted that there were many who saw the eighteenth century as a period in which these
two accounts came into increasingly overt conflict, with the conservative reaction to the
millennial institutionalism of the French Revolution taking center stage.59 In this context,
he argued,  Vico stood for sophistication,  because he saw that the law of  unintended
consequences meant that institutions were a complex amalgam of initiatives undertaken
at particular times for particular consciously recognized reasons that over time became
habits the rationale for which changed beyond recognition or was forgotten altogether.60
28 I would add that, in making this argument, Fisch was in essence claiming that Vico was
not to be understood as a partisan in any debate between Enlightenment and Counter-
Enlightenment. If anything, Vico was an antidote to that debate. In this way, Fisch was
seceding from a line of inquiry that runs from Elio Gianturco, through Isaiah Berlin and
Mark Lilla, down to Zeev Sternhell.61 It is in this context that we are able to understand
Lilla’s rejection of Fisch’s rendering of cosa as “institution.” To Lilla, this editorial choice
may well have implied the presupposition that religion was merely optional for Vico (as
distinct from a necessary substrate of any viable society).  And,  to be sure,  Fisch had
argued in his 1961 introduction that “Vico shares with the Marxists and existentialists the
negative view that there is no human essence to be found in individuals as such, and with
the Marxists the positive view that the essence of humanity is the ensemble of social
relations, or the developing system of institutions.”62
29 Even  such  a  sympathetic  interpreter  as  Don  Roberts  would  take  exception  to  this
assertion, when, in 1985, he asked Fisch whether Vico’s providentialism did not in fact
imply that for him Man was created in God’s image in such a way that no truck could be
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had with Sartrean claims that existence precedes essence. Fisch simply replied that what
he meant was that, to Vico’s way of thinking, the question of what a human being would
be  like  in  the  absence  of  any  human  institutions  or  community  was  essentially
unanswerable. This was a question, Vico said, that had destroyed seventeenth-century
investigations into the state of nature.63 What might be more interesting for Lilla, though,
would be the admission in the same interview that, although he had been an ordained
minister of the Disciples of Christ in his youth (and had preached intermittently for a
year or so), Fisch – if pressed – would have to answer the question, “Are you an atheist,”
in the affirmative. If religious institutions had had positive effects qua institutions, he
continued, then the key thing was to ask what other institutions could achieve the same
ends without “the superstitions.”64
30 Even more striking for our present purposes,  however,  was another essay that  Fisch
published in Japan in 1959, entitled “The Philosophy of History, A Dialogue.” There, he
appeared  to  argue  that  not  just  the  philosopher  but  even  the  historian  was  to  be
understood as a critic of institutions.65 This was an essay staged as a debate between a
philosopher  and  a  historian  over  the  status  of  covering  laws  in  history.  Are  we  to
understand the  articulation of  cause  and effect  relationships  between two events  in
history as invocations of general laws that would be expressed in a multitude of cases?
The  historian  resists  the  philosopher’s  attempts  to  foist  necessitarianism  onto  his
discipline and responds by arguing that the historian is involved in the narration of the
coming  into  being  of  institutions  that  could  be  otherwise.  Rule-following  is  itself  a
historical phenomenon: rules develop and decay; they do not simply “hold.” Criticism of
institutions  is  therefore  always  a  possibility  for  historians,  because  the  story  of  the
genesis of those institutions is simultaneously an accounting of their contingency. The
historian persona in the “Dialogue” is entirely explicit: “objectivity” in the discipline of
history does not entail an “absence of criticism, but [rather] unreserved submission to
further criticism, complete openness, withholding nothing from judgment.”66 That is, the
objective historian is not someone who refrains from praising or blaming the institutions
the history of which he or she is examining. It is simply that no such evaluation may
prevent  that  historian  from considering  new evidence  illuminating  that  institution’s
value. In the dialogue, the philosopher responds by saying that this all sounds rather
familiar,  given  that  he  himself  had  recently  given  a  talk  in  which  he  defined  the
philosopher as the critic of institutions. The historian is unperturbed and sees no problem
with this: there is,  he says, “a continuum of inquiry connecting the shortest-tethered
grubbing of the historian with the most abstract and universal critiques and speculations
of the philosopher.”67
31 What surprises me in these various definitions and discussions is Fisch’s lack of attention
to the word “critic.” “Institution” was such a crucial word for him, perhaps, that the
other part of his respective definitions of the philosopher and the historian became as
inconspicuous as a habit. Vichian that he was, though, this term ought to have caught his
eye. If we were to channel the spirit of Max Fisch for a minute to gloss the letter of Max
Fisch, we would say that “critic” connoted its antistrophe, “topic,” and that the term
“critic” ought not to be understood as a person – whether philosopher or historian – but
rather as a mode of inquiry. Within the rhetorical frame of reference, the ars topica had
been a series of  tactics for finding arguments;  the ars  critica,  a  discipline focused on
adjudicating goodness and badness in inference. We can suppose therefore that, for Fisch,
the critic of institutions was the person who considered whether the arguments made
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and implied by institutions were or were not good ones or (more deflationary) consistent
ones.
32 When we  find  Fisch  saying  in  one  of  his  Japanese  papers  that  “with  regard  to  any
institution it is wise to inquire what purpose it was designed to serve [and] whether that
purpose is still our purpose,” we see the historian and the philosopher working closely in
tandem to interrogate our reasons for continuing to practice in the future what we have
practiced  in  the  past.68 But  this  is  a  relatively  unremarkable  thought.  The  more
interesting line pushes towards what we might term the “topic of institutions.” It is the
sheer variety and historical vicissitude of practices in any given institution that points
out  not  only  their  contingency but  also  the hitherto unarticulated possibilities  lying
between, among, and at odds with these practices.  The point is not simply to decide
whether a principle of sufficient reason rules over our institutional practices. The point is
rather to find ways of forever finding new ways of achieving our goals and of achieving a
clearer sense of what new goals we might pursue. Fisch’s most basic article of faith, it
seems to me, was an ever-open future – the irrepressible creativity of inquiry. As such, his
more basic allegiance was to topic and not critic.
 
5. Style
33 Using Max Fisch to  think about  Max Fisch is,  in  point  of  fact,  precisely  the kind of
doubling of – or, better, extrapolation from – the historical record that Fisch himself
began to  use  with  greater  frequency  in  his  later  work.  Based  on the  published and
unpublished  sources  that  we  have,  it  would  seem  that  this  was  an  unconscious
development more than a conscious one. As such, one can only offer a theoretical account
of this practice by making explicit several assertions that, if adopted and implemented,
would lead to the kind of practices that we see in a number of essays dating from the
1960s and 1970s. One might describe the focus of this section as a close analysis of style.
“Style” though must not be understood as something optional that is added to a thought
once its content has been determined. Genre, mode, and device are just as constitutive of
thinking in the context of historiography as they are in thought more generally. Thought
events come into being through and because of such frames and presentations. As Fisch
would say, himself channeling Vico and Peirce, “language is not merely a medium for the
communication of thought but is the medium of thought itself.”69
34 Fisch’s “A Chronicle of Pragmaticism, 1865-1879,” which appeared in 1964, was indicative
of  one recurrent mode of  Fischian analysis.  The article,  published in The Monist as  a
supplement,  took  an  almost  notational  form.  Broken  down  into  a  year-by-year  and
month-by-month  accounting  of  events  in  Peirce’s  mental  life,  the  essay  was  almost
positivistic in its desire to set out every piece of possible evidence before proceeding
further. Only at the very end did the reader receive seven discrete conclusions. Indeed,
although the adjective “positivistic” has become more of an insult than a descriptor, one
ought really to say that positivism was precisely what Fisch was after: like a sequence of
promulgations in positive law, a firm chronology (which he described as “the prerequisite
of history”) was what Fisch wanted.70 Indeed, on the odd occasions that Fisch managed to
specify  points  in  Peirce’s  mental  life  on  a  day-by-day  basis,  one  detects  in  him  a
frustration that the process of decomposition could not be carried further – hour-by-
hour,  minute-by-minute,  sentence-by-sentence  would  seem  to  have  been  the
desideratum. We see therefore that the atomization implied by the chronicle format was
Historical and Philosophical Stances
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-2 | 2016
13
but a stage in an ironic process, for it was the connections between and among these
points that were crucial, connections that drove these points towards a continuum of
perceptions and the implied inferences that selected them.
35 Following  Peirce  (and  a  long  tradition  in  the  history  of  thought),  Fisch  understood
thinking as itself a kind of internalized dialogue. To him, this constituted an alternative
to the more common way of understanding speech as a kind of externalized thinking. For
this reason, we ought to understand his experiments with the dialogue form itself as
attempts to capture and analyze the sequence, the strophe and antistrophe, of thinking
itself.  Thus,  dialogue and chronicle were two literary modes that only appeared to be
diametrically  opposed.  In  fact,  they  were  extremely  similar  in  their  aims.  In  “The
Poliscraft” of 1974, Fisch was much more identifiable with the figure of the classicist than
he was with the other two interlocutors, a political scientist and a philosopher. Therefore,
we may think of this essay as an attempt to anticipate (or perhaps report) the kind of
argument that members of these three disciplines might find themselves involved in,
were they to examine seriously the question of how all three could examine the same
texts within entirely disparate disciplinary frameworks.71 “The Philosophy of History,”
from 1959, was a little different. As Fisch clarified in 1985, his person is to be identified
neither with the philosopher nor with the historian but with both equally.72 Fisch, thus,
was  deliberately  doubling  himself  in  order  to  interrogate  the  nature  of  his  own
statements. But his process was not simply a critical one. It was properly topical in the
sense that dialogue opened up a distance between the interlocutors, a discursive topos
that  –  perhaps  in  the  manner  of  a  vacuum –  called  into  being  new positions,  new
considerations, new questions.
36 It  is  in  the context  of  this  line  of  thinking that  we should interpret  another  of  the
seemingly innocuous devices that Fisch used to represent his historical and philosophical
investigations. Take his 1973 essay on “Hegel and Peirce,” for instance. There, we find
Fisch engaged in an enumeration of what he argued were the twenty-one discrete steps
that Peirce worked through when he was using Hegel to revise the categories of Kant.73
Enumeration is almost an anti-style, a philosophical procedure feigning utter sobriety.
Within a Vichian frame of reference, such enumeration might appear to be something
akin  to  Cartesian  soritic,  because  it  gives  the  impression  of  reveling  in  the  utmost
conceptual  explicitness,  leaving  nothing  for  the  reader  to  infer.  The  appearance  is
misleading. Cartesian soritic is an inferential form that begins with intuitions held to be
indubitable and proceeds by way of deductions that follow necessarily from the previous
assertions. In contrast, Fischian enumeration begins not in indubitability but rather in a
sliding from authority into doubt. Witness his account of the origin of Peirce’s thinking
on categories,  which becomes ostentatious with just a little emphasis:  Peirce “at first
accepted Kant’s list, as if from Sinai.”74 But inquiry begins in doubt. Just so, a forty-year
inquiry sequence was,  in Fisch’s opinion,  precipitated by Peirce’s use of  Kant against
Kant: “he began finding among the categories in Kant’s list relations other than those
that Kant himself pointed out.”75 And the key term in that sentence is “finding.” What we
have here is an unannounced hypothesis: that for Peirce and Fisch alike the history of
philosophy was an ars topica and not an ars critica.
37 We see that, from a stylistic point of view, one of the fundamental facts about intellectual
historiography is disquotation. In turn, disquotation is an iteration of the kind of topical
inquiry we have just seen Fisch engaged in during “Hegel and Peirce.” Absolutely crucial
here is the movement from what, for instance, Kant actually said to what he might well
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have said (but did not). When, as Fisch supposed, Peirce was “finding among the categories
in Kant’s list relations other than those that Kant himself pointed out” what he was doing
was impersonating Kant in order to go further into Kantian thinking than Kant himself
had done. Kantian potential was being derived from Kantian act. Expressed in the terms
of intellectual historiographic style,  the potentialities of paraphrase emerge from the
actualities of quotation. Every intellectual historian struggles, consciously or not, with
the complexity of the shift from oratio recta to oratio obliqua and vice versa. The reasons
for  this  are  not  just  that  there  can be  no paraphrase  that  is  not  always  already an
interpretation but also that indirect speech has an impetus and a creativity of its own. For
the simple reason that intellectual historians do not wish always to be interjecting with
markers such as “said Peirce,” attributed indirect discourse very often slips – in ways that
are impalpable to writer and reader alike – into a kind of free and indirect roving.
38 Although Fisch resisted such elision of attribution to an extent that distinguished him
(his commitment to philology was as strong as his commitment to philosophy), we do find
a good deal of this paraphrastic mode in that Fischian gem, “Vico and Pragmatism.” Thus,
we find in the text the following assertions: “the logic of deduction is not the logic of
science; experiment is central to the logic of physics, not just an adjunct; it is heuristic
and inductive;  it  belongs  to  topic,  not  critic;  and that  is  why the  new critic  of  the
Cartesians, who neglect topic as the Stoics did, cannot be the logic of science.”76 Who is
the author of these assertions? Vico, Peirce, Fisch? Read in context, it is clear that this is
paraphrase, with the attributor “said Vico” elided, but there is no easy way to return this
abbreviated oratio obliqua to its original  form, as quotation.  Too much confection has
taken place in the meantime, and the true author here cannot be understood as Vico or
Peirce or Fisch but as a curious and creative synthesis of the three. In this way, Fisch’s
extraordinary apostrophe at the end of the essay, in which he impersonated what Peirce
would have said if  he had read Vico,  was simply the stylistic counterpart of  a mode
already well established in the body of the essay itself. The invention of counter-factual
quotation was disquotation reversed.
39 One final example will suffice to confirm, for the moment, the suspicion raised here that
the  stylistics  of  Fischian  historiography  have  real  significance.  In  the  1977  piece,
“American Pragmatism Before and After 1898,” we find ourselves in an entirely different
stylistic universe. Counter-factuality has metastasized from the “last suggestion” of 1969
into a thought experiment that organizes the entire essay. The essay pivoted on the first
usage of the term “pragmatism” in a public address, by William James in 1898. Fisch bade
author and reader to “imagine ourselves as  members of  the Philosophical  Union […]
attending James’s address, reading it soon afterwards, [and] being moved by it.”77 Behind
us, lay the reading we had done to prepare ourselves for the event – namely, James’s The
Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy – and the history of pragmatism from
1865 to 1898 that we would be moved by James’s talk to investigate. Ahead of us from
1898 onward,  lay  the  future  history  of  pragmatism as we were  continuing it  in  our
present intellectual labor and by others as yet unknown to us. This temporal manifold of
past and future, pluperfects, future perfects, and hypotheticals all perceived from the
vantage point of a very particular present was the frame within which Fisch wanted to
situate  all  of  the  minds  that  were  or  would  be  party  to  his  essay.  It  was  a  frame,
constructed out of a historic present tense, that asserted the indivisibly of historical and
philosophical inquiry. Just so, it culminated in the tasks that Fisch himself took to be
Historical and Philosophical Stances
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-2 | 2016
15




40 As Fisch was narrating this culmination of “American Pragmatism Before and After 1898”
for the communities of inquiry that existed in 1977, he mentioned – almost, but not quite,
as an aside – that “work has begun on a new and much more comprehensive edition of
[Peirce’s] writings, in chronological order, including a large portion of still unpublished
work.”78 He was, of course, referring to The Writings of Charles S.  Peirce:  A Chronological
Edition,  which was to supersede the thematically  organized Collected Papers edition of
Hartshorne and Weiss. By now it should be clear why Fisch believed with such conviction
that a chronological edition of the writings was so essential. It was not simply that no one
could understand Peirce who did not know how the myriad iterations of his philosophy
constituted lines of inquiry pursued – if not continuously then at least serially – from the
1860s until his death in 1914. It was also that no one could hope to continue those lines of
inquiry  who  did  not  have  access  to  such  a  temporally  indexed  archive.  After  all,  a
trajectory  can  only  be  projected  if  the  data  points  one  possesses  are  ordered
chronologically, and the seedbed of inference is the topical motley of assertions or proto-
assertions than spans particular moments of inquiry.
41 In  truth,  this  was  another  point  at  which  Fisch  was  adopting  the  assertions  of  the
historical figures he studied and transforming them into assertions made in his own voice
and put into practice by his own person. After all, it was Peirce who had told him that “all
thought is in signs.” And, from Peirce’s various explications of this point, Fisch drew the
paraphrases that “every thought continues another and is continued by still another,”
that “there are no uninferred premisses and no inference-terminating conclusions,” and
that “inferring is the sole act of the mind.”79 If semiosis was at work (and in dyadic as
distinct from triadic action it would not be), then there was no object that was not a sign
and no sign that did not bring into being an interpretant.80 One task that the historian
and the philosopher shared was to be forever and creatively aware of the possibilities
implicit  in  this  semiosis  without  end.  Equally,  this  work  consisted  either  in  seeing
whether some of these potentialities had in fact been carried into actuality in the past or
in asking whether one might wish to do so in the future.
42 Fisch was himself a vehicle for precisely this kind of semiosis – simultaneously historical
and philosophical – when on 23 January 1980 he wrote to Bernhard Kendler at Cornell
University  Press  in reference  to  a  manuscript  titled  “Giambattista  Vico’s  Science  of
Imagination”  by  Donald  Verene.81 Fisch  indicated  that  he  was  unable  to  provide  “a
detailed  and  formal evaluation”  of  the  manuscript,  but  he  thought  it  ought  to  be
published. What he did want to say was that the book brought into focus a new and
interesting line of inquiry. Verene, he related, was the editor of the journal, Philosophy and
Rhetoric;  Vico had been professor of Latin Eloquence at the University of Naples;  and
Peirce, he estimated, “was perhaps the greatest of those philosophers who have not only
devoted  themselves  to  retaining  rhetoric  along  with  grammar  and  logic,  and  to
developing it further, but have made it preeminent in the trivium.” Peirce’s achievement
in this regard, he argued, was to see the error of those who took rhetoric to be nothing
more than “a bag of tricks for persuading an audience or a readership of something that
is in the persuader’s interest, regardless of its truth or falsity.” Fisch went on to say that
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people  failed  to  recognize  this  because,  in  his  later  work,  Peirce  used  the  term
“methodeutic” in place of “rhetoric.”82 Nevertheless, rhetoric was not to be understood as
an art of persuasion. It was “the art of discovery.” Indeed, it was the art of semiosis.
43 Fisch’s realization here was something like an epiphany.  Like a Peircean investigator
becoming aware of the reasons for his guessing only after the fact, Fisch was becoming
conscious of the previously hidden inferential connections among the various projects of
his life. To be sure, Fisch had already established connections between Vico and Peirce in
the 1969 article that asserted an essential parallel between Vico’s path from nominalism
to realism and Peirce’s and that also identified Vico’s verum-factum theory as a kind of
proto-pragmatism. And before that he was aware of the explicit connections that took
him from Roman law to Vico to American jurisprudence and the prediction theory of
Holmes.  But  the  rhetorical  connection  was  new;  or  rather,  Fisch’s  attention  to  that
connection was new. And reading Peirce into this rhetorical lineage was his confection,
not Verene’s. Indeed, if we look back at Fisch’s work with this issue in mind, we are struck
by his former ignorance and disattention. In a letter to Bergin (written before the winter
of 1942/3 and in connection to their translation of the Vita), Fisch confessed that of all the
words in the Vichian lexicon the two giving him the most  trouble were ingegno and
acutezza  –  the  key  terms  of  Vico’s  Baroque-inflected  reception of  classical  rhetorical
theory. He was struggling to find satisfactory uniform translations and supposed that a
literary historian would know more about this kind of thing.83 Likewise, in his 1971 essay,
“Peirce’s  Arisbe,”  Fisch  noted  that  Peirce,  having  found  a  life’s  vocation  reading
Whately’s Logic in 1851, moved next to a work on rhetoric that “set [him] thinking for
[himself].”84 But the significance of the connection was not expanded upon. Indeed, in a
footnote, Fisch went on to say that this thinking for himself had led Peirce to compose a
treatise on “The Dynamics of Persuasion,” only to add that he had lost the reference to
the manuscript in which Peirce gave this title.85
44 To this list of missed opportunities, one might add Fisch’s introduction of Isaiah Berlin in
1974, which focused on the notion of zetetics as a “general science of research” without
connecting Vico and Peirce.86 Moreover, when Fisch did go further into Peirce’s rhetorical
inheritance (as in the 1978 essay on “Peirce’s General Theory of Signs”), the connection to
Vico was not a factor.87 Again, in 1954 Fisch had done significant work in tracing the
influence of Alexander Bain’s conception of belief (as that on the basis of which a man
was prepared to act)  on Peirce’s development of pragmatism, but he did not in turn
explore the rhetorical origins of Bain’s conception.88 But perhaps the most persuasive
evidence for the hypothesis that around 1980 a matrix of  connections was becoming
explicit  that  had  to  that  point  remained  implicit  in  Fisch’s  work  came  in  the  two
installments  of  “The  Range  of  Peirce’s  Relevance”  –  published  in  1980  and  1982,
respectively.  In  1980,  “the  logic  of  discovery”  connoted a  tradition running through
Peirce, Dewey, and Popper – with Vico and rhetorical inventio nowhere to be seen. In 1982,
Fisch was demonstrating an awareness of “the new rhetoric” of Charles Perelman and
Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca.89
45 The point here is not to fault Fisch for not being even more ingenious than he already
was.  The  point  is  simply  to  identify  as  many  lines  of  inquiry  as  we  can  into  the
connections among Vico, Peirce, and Fisch, rhetoric, semiosis, and the logic of discovery.
Moreover, we should understand that Fisch’s own eventual perception of the continuity
running through Vico and Peirce on the issue of discovery was one that made sense of his
double  identity  as  historian and philosopher.  What  was  “scientific  discovery”  in  the
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context of twentieth-century philosophy had been inventio to Vico and all those from
antiquity to early modernity who had been invested in the rhetorical tradition. Fisch
intuited that this continuity (not identity) allowed one to think of intellectual historians
as persons who became immersed in the thought of past thinkers to the point that they
could begin to bring the languages of those thinkers back to life – to, as it were, learn the
grammar  of  those  dead  languages  and  begin  to  speak  them  again  with  a  mastery
permitting them to bring new configurations into existence, to fashion sentences that
were grammatically correct according to the parameters of a dead conceptual language
but that had not been uttered before. Qua historians, such individuals would be wanting
constantly to compare their inventions to the historical record, to see if there were ways
in which their innovations had, in fact, been anticipated. In that event, the innovation
would become something like a verified prediction. Insofar as such historians of thought
could also be thinkers in their own right,  however, they would experience a falsified
prediction – that is, an innovation that turned out not to have been anticipated in the
historical record – as a discovery that they themselves might assert in their own name. As
such, the history of thought would remain there, always, a reservoir of potential thoughts
never  yet  brought  into  actuality,  waiting  for  the  moment  at  which  some  chance
connection would transform them from mute philological objects into signs replete once
more with their own interpretants.
 
7. Conclusion
46 In the extremely famous and still influential 1969 article alluded to in the introduction to
this paper, Quentin Skinner argued that historians of ideas ought not to be in the business
of  looking to  the  past  for  their  beliefs:  “we must  learn to  do  our  own thinking for
ourselves,” he said.90 History was not a series of responses to problems that were eternal
and  unchanging.  Not  simply  the  answers  but  even  the  questions  themselves  –  they
evolved over time. As a result, the best that history could offer, over and above antique
erudition, was exorcism. That is, the ephemeralness of questions in the history of thought
ought  to  demonstrate  to  us  that  the  answers themselves  had  a  highly  contingent
relevance. Only under certain conditions were particular intellectual formations decisive,
or even useful. Where the historian could dredge up possibilities from the past that had
been foregone and covered over, the upshot ought not to be the reinvigoration of a past
research agenda but rather an instant of defamiliarization. The strangeness of the past
could reveal the strangeness of the present, for each was but a contingent way station. In
response  to  accusations  that  he  turned  historical  inquiry  into  a  form  of  mere
antiquarianism,  Skinner  invoked  Foucaultian  archaeology  (rendering  the  present
strange) and Nietzschean genealogy (occluded possibilities from the past gave one pause,
made one ruminate).91 But these were oddly unsustained gestures. The divisions of labor
stood: historians of political thought on one side, for instance, political theorists on the
other.
47 Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual historical method insisting that
practitioners remain agnostics about the value of the ideas they study. It is the chief
contention of this essay that he is a paradigm for intellectual historians, a paradigm both
in the original Greek sense of an example and in the derived contemporary sense of a
framework within which the community of research can proceed. Indeed, it is precisely
such doubling of the philological object qua example into a carapace for ongoing action
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and thought that Fisch explored in a variety of ways during his half-century of creative
intellectual work. Law was a zone of interpretation where the virtual qualities of meaning
became manifest. There, the letter of a decision ought to be understood in reference to
the  future.  Some might  think  of  that  future  as  predictable,  but  the  history  of  legal
languages and institutions demonstrated that it was not. As such, the particular judicial
acts  of  particular  courts  were  transformed  into  precedents  with  unintended
consequences,  and  example  became  framework.  Translation  was  a  training  in  the
extraordinarily subtle syntactic and semantic rigors of entering into an alien language.
The point was not simply to achieve competence in, say, Italian. The goal was an ability to
enter into the structure of another thinker’s modes of invention, to the point that one
could construct thoughts – some reconstructed, some new – in the style of that thinker.
This, moreover, was a goal that a translator could achieve only by leaving a good deal of
the interpretative work to the translation’s readers. A translation should be strange and
resolute – a philological fact of some inexplicability – in precisely the degree that would
provoke such readers to begin to learn that writer’s terminology and lines of inquiry for
themselves. In this way, a translation should become something like an institution – that
is, a framework for action that is not so tightly ordered that it cannot, by means of the
variety of  its  injunctions and practices,  stimulate the generation of  new practices or
improvisations  on  the  themes  it  established.  And,  even  as  Fisch  was  literal-minded
enough to understand such institutionality in some very concrete, almost bureaucratic
ways, he was also enough of a poet to see that the task of discovering and exploiting the
spaces between assertions made by figures become crucial in the history of thought was, in
large part, a stylistic task that required experimentation and variety. Finally, although he
was tactful in this regard, Fisch did not hesitate to practice the beliefs he appropriated
from the past intellectual initiatives that he thought important. He did his thinking for
himself precisely by adopting, adapting, and cobbling together the thought sequences of
those he valued most. This was, in fact, an appropriation of Peirce’s account of semiosis.
The meaning of any given sentence was to be understood not only in terms of the prior
sentences  to  which  that  sentence  was  reacting  but  also  in  terms  of  the  subsequent
sentences that such sequences brought into being. If some of those sentences were Vico’s,
some Peirce’s, and some Fisch’s, that did not matter.
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ABSTRACTS
This article explores the intellectual life of Max Harold Fisch, the twentieth-century American
scholar  of  Giambattista  Vico  and  Charles  S.  Peirce.  Fisch  was  a  thinker  with  fundamental
commitments  to  both  history  and  philosophy.  The  claim  here  is  that  his  life  exemplifies  a
constitutive tension in the work of intellectual historians, who operate in the interstice between
these two disciplines. What we learn is that intellectual historians may have a double investment
both in the filigree of particular historical contexts and in the principles that emerge in and then
detach from those contexts. The article explores this double investment by following it through
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